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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN LEACH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 13808
-vsNORMA B. ANDERSON and
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

)

DEFENDANT'S AND RESPONDENT'S,
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY'S,
PETITION FOR REHEARING

I - PETITION FOR REHEARING
Valley Bank and Trust Company, a Defendant and Respondent, move
the Court for an Order clarifying its decision of May 29, 1975, or for
rehearing.
II - INTRODUCTION
The decision as set forth creates considerable confusion in the trust
law of the State of Utah and for administrators of Trusts and it would be of
considerable assistance to those involved in the administration of Trusts if
the rehearing were granted and the opinion clarified so as to avoid problems
and conform the law.

Ill - THE RULING OF THE COURT
IN RELATION TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IS CONFUSING AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PRIOR COURT DECISIONS

It is conceded in this case by the Court and all parties that the
applicable statute of limitations is contained in 70A-12-26 Utah Code Annotated,
Subsection k9 which provides that an action must be instituted within three
years after a liability created by the statute of the state comes into being.
In this case, in accordance with the findings of the District
Court, the irrevocable Trust Agreement was adopted on November 12, 1968,
Finding No. 5, and that "directly after the creation of the Trust the title
to the real property was transferred to the name of the nominee of the
Trustee11 (Finding No. 12).
The obligation to the Plaintiff was created approximately a year
later, April 15, 1969.
The lower Court found that there was no fraud and that Mrs.
Anderson made no representations whatsoever to the Plaintiff and that he had
no right to rely upon the financial statements of the Plaintiff

(Conclusions

of Law No. 1 and 2 ) .
The thing that the Court sets aside is the Trust.

Since the Trust

is created in 19685, the date of its creation has to be the controlling date
in relation to the running of the statute of limitations that gives the
right to set aside the Trust*
This was not a secret Trust.

Notices were available to any inquiring

creditor and deeds recorded.
Since the thing being set aside as to this creditor is the Trust,
then the statute of limitations must run from the date of the creation of
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the Trust.

The Court should not confuse this case with the case of actual

fraud for if there had been representations of financial solvency or ownership of property, then the statute could run from the date of the discovery
of the fraudulent representations.
representations.

In this case there are no fraudulent

The Court has found that there are none.

To use the analogy that Subsection k of the three year statute
of limitations should be similarly applied as to Subsection 2 which involves
theft of personal property or Subsection 3 which involves fraud is to read
into Subsection k the following wording which is contained in Subsection
(2) and (3):
M

... the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable man on inquiry..oH
H

(3)..o the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed td
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of t|ie
facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
There is no similar wording in Subsection *f and, therefore, by any
application of rules of construction the Legislature did not intend the
application of Subsection k to betolled unti 1 there was ''discovery by the
agreed parties18.
Trusts continue for many years, sometimes through two and three
generations being limited only by the rule against perpetuities.
It is apparent that the Legislature intended that an action to
set aside a Trust, which action is commenced under a specific statutory
authority and is a derivation of the common law, must be commenced within
three years; otherwise, the Trust would be valid and enforceable in all of
its particulars.

- 3-

The case of Smith v. Edwards, Supreme Court of Utah, December 31>
1932, 17 P 2d 264, considered fraudulent conveyances which is certainly
an analogous or similar matter to that presently before the Court.

That

case has many similarities with the present case for in the Smith case the
indebtedness was not contracted for more than two years after the conveyances
were placed of record (Page 268).

In the present case the debt is contracted

a year after the conveyances are placed of record and the Trust created.

In

the 5mith case the Court held n from the t|me of recording of these conveyances...
the Plaintiffs and ajl pther persons had notice of such conveyances.. f H
In the Sm^th case the Cpurt noted that "oq inquiry of any nature seems to have
been made...11 (P^ge 271)

an<

* in the present case the Court found that Mr.

Leach had made no Inqijlfy of any nature.
two cases are many foldf

The similarities between these

On Page 272 the Court said that the ''question is

not fhe financial CPncJ|fion so long after the transfers but the financial
condition at t\\e time of the transfers'1.

|n the present case at the |ime

of the transfer Mrs, Anderson had already (divested herself of the ownership
of the trust assets and notice thereof had been placed of record and the
Plaintiff had made no inquiry in relation to the assetp.
The Court, on Page 272, states:
"We are of the opinion that the action is barred under the
statute of limitations for the reason that discovery was made, or
the situation was such as to furnish full opportunity for the
discovery of fraud, if any existed, more than three years before
the bringing of the action. We are further of the opinion there
was no fraud shown..."
The opinion of the Court seems to consider that there was fraud
in this case for in the decision it is said:

- k -

M

The situation is analogous [to fraud per sejand the same
principal applies H
The Court assumed facts not in evidence as a reason for failing
to consider and rule as to whether or not the Plaintiff was entitled to
real estate or proceeds of real estate placed in trust.
There is a financial sheet that pre-dates by a substantial time
the creation of the Trust and the present date which states that the
Anderson Enterprises stock was valued at $l*t5,000.
There is no evidence as to the value of that stock or any of the
personal property that was transferred to the trust estate.
In fact, although not in evidence, the Anderson Enterprises stock
is of questionable value and may be completely valueless.

Your Petitioner

should not bring into this matter evidence that is not in the case below,
but, on the other hand, the Court must limit its decision to the facts
presented below and there were no facts in the lower Court to indicate the
value of the personal property that was placed into the Trust.

There was

substantial evidence as to the value of the real estate placed in Trust.
Therefore, the final paragraph of the Decision should be eliminated or
modified so as not to create confusion in the law or to base this decision
on facts not in evidence.

IV - CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court should be revised to either determine
that the cause of action of the Plaintiff is barred by the three-year statute
of limitations or to otherwise rationalize the ruling without effecting
judicial

legislation.

- 5 -.

This case without further clarification makes unsure all existing
trusts and puts the administrators thereof in jeopardy, all to the detriment
of the citizens of the State and the administration of trust processes.
Therefore, the decision should be clarified or expanded so as to give definitive
rules to the draftsman and the trust administrator so that the problerp created
by this case can be avoided in future cases.
This Court has many times said it would avoid judicial

legislation

and leave to the legislators the modification of the statutes and the
declarations of public policy.

Therefore, this decision should be modified

so that either the Court candidly assumes the responsibility for judicial
legislation and inserts in Subsection (k) of 70A-12-26 UCA the words *'but
the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until
the discovery by the aggrieved party11 or the decision should be modifjed to
determine that this case is barred by the statute of limitations of the State
of Utah.

7
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ju iify j.ii«'h allowances (here should be before the court such a record as would establish at least a probability of her succeeding
i n the iinal disposition of the case.

It is therefore ordered that the temporary
writ heretofore issued be made periininu;
upon the record as it now stands.

Had the allegations of her unfitness to enter into the marriage covenant been untrue, it
would have been a simple mailer to have denied them ami to have supported such denials*

STRAUP, ELI AS HANSEN, TOLLAND
and EWIIIAIM HANSON, JJ., concur.
CHERRY, 0 . J., did not participate herein,

Initios as they i
.-iiion of what
ncrty is, am
pr.-.
. .
l i a b l e value is 1
!„• iviiuirod to
specifying their
tviil mnturc
Oviuhiirnt ennv

s e m e p r e 'li mi n a r y e v i d e n c e t e n d in:: t o
(.'(imi!<el
iisii i t' r ;:ii;v-i«':il ccmd'.iiim*
•-! :}*: •'•':'7 T.'.-in •-: ' i c r ;.i " j e U . u c it!
V,i
'• •
;i; ;i v. ' "ne^. -e\~:. . .:s'."i:^;.. .n„
h

•

lii ..»•• ... •:;••. •. .\.:i.v. : .. .'- ;;.:; /u':. ;.• r.mie^
ivii.u. :.-• •vni:: ;L: v'vt\'U- o»ut: i . . ' : r ^
o & i / n u t i 1. Vi,£DY« w u y . r * .
iiij,;
ct^ IT.: -jotftf 'i.e^irvuis v.micti, *NO. 5 i a i .
.rue. whoii./ detcut either tueir or her right
to allowances out of the estate of the deSupreme Court of Utah.
ceased. Under such conditions we do not
Dec. 31, 1932.
think it a sullicient answer to say that they
are entitled to allowances as a condition
precedent to their being required to answer. I. Fraudulent conveyances €=»74(3).
CoDTevarjce without consideration !? *V%
y\\l-\y:.?.
c.^j^rl
l}:.2t V:JC^T t i e j.5ivr a s
!.".*>, 124 N. (*;. 804, Kathryne fly rue would
not have been entitled to an allowance in
any event for the reason that alimony and
counsel fees can be allowed only during coverture and that the right ceases with death.
B u t the allowance for the support of the
claimed widow was not made by the district
court in the nature of alimony. It was made
in the administration of the estate under the
statute providing for family support. If i t
should be finally established that the parties were in fact husband and wife, then it
necessarily follows that the allowance is proper.
But the allowance for attorney's fees and
suit money must rest on a different basis. A s
pointed out in the Farnham Case, the right
to suit money and counsel fees in actions affecting the marriage relations cease with
death. The rights of the parties after the
death of one spouse depend upon the law applicable to the administration of estates.
Neither statute nor decisions have been called
t o the attention of the court, and the writer
has been unable to discover any, providing
that where a person is attempting to establish his or her right to participate in the distribution of an estate, that the sinews of war
should be furnished by or from the estate. In
the Farnham Case; it is clearly pointed out
that where such a contest as this is before
tlie court, the opposing parties are not obligated to furnish suit money nor counsel fees
t o the woman who is attempting to establish her marital status. In like manner the
<*t;uio siLOulcUv*. protected.from•\K*XU% <teplet«•iu.

No
court
facts
irvm*

question is raised a s to the right of the
to issue a writ of prohibition under the
of this case. We therefore refrain
c*cr~S'i'ic*xxii£ it*

against creditors, though grantor is Iar?*;j
indebted (Laws 1925, c. 42, § 2, subd. 1).
Conveyance is not necessarily fraudulent because it is made without consideration and while grantor is indebted in
large amounts of money, for grantor may
still have ample resources to pay all of
such amounts and all other indebtedness
existing at time of conveyance or maturing thereafter. Laws 1925, c. 42, § 2,
subd. 1, defines person as being insolvent
when present fair salable value of his assets is less than amount required to pay
his probable liability on his existing debts
as they mature.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Voluntary," see Words and Phrases.]
2. Pleading <£»8(I5).
Allegation that grantor remains in possession after conveying land is fact allegation
and may or may not prove fraud against
creditors (Laws 1925, c. 42).
3. Pleading <£=>8(I5).
Allegation that grantor received rents,
issues, and profits of property after its conveyance is fact allegation and may or may
not establish fraud against creditors (Laws
1925, c. 42).
4. Pleading C=*8(I5).
Allegation that, by conveying lands, grantor became insolvent, is mere conclusion, and,
to establish fraud against creditors, must be
amplified by supporting facts, though un attacked by demurrer or motion (Laws !&£, t
4&,t^;ui-:i..U,.
Under Laws 1925, c. 42, § 2, subd. 1,
defining insolvent person, allegation that
person is insolvent must be amplified by
allegations of fact as to amount of money
r-e^lred to JS*T his jfrofcsil* exii'iiiij: lia-

®»For other cases Bee same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Index*!
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tees, and only other sources of informaMillies ns tboy mature, and also by alletion as to title to property would be recgation of what fair salable value of his
ords of conveyances in county recorder's
property is, and that such present fair
ofliec, or sonic interested or disinterested
salable value is less than amount that will
third persons, it appearing further that
be required to pay his existing debts,
deeds were recorded soon after their exespecifying their amounts, and when they
cution, and that about six months after
will mature.
their recording, grantor moved from con5. Fraudulent conveyances <S==>6.
veyed lands arid grantees were thereafter
So far as cause of action involves matin occupation and use of property.
ters occurring prior to Fraudulent Convey11.
Fraudulent conveyances <©=»77.
ances Act, act is inoperative (Laws 1025, c.
If fair consideration is given, creditors
42).
may not attack conveyance because of gran6. Fraudulent conveyances <S=»263(I).
tor's insolvency (Laws 1925, c. 42, § 3).
Provisions of Fraudulent Conveyances
Laws 1925, c. 42, § 3, declares that fair
Act are in harmony with general law respectconsideration is given when in exchange
ing necessity of specifically pleading facts
for property, or obligation, as fair equivconstituting fraud (Laws 1925, c. 42).
alent therefor, and in good faith, prop7. Fraudulent conveyances <§=>263(l), 2 9 5 ( 0 .
erty is conveyed or antecedent debt is
Where there is fair or valuable considsatisfied, or when such property or obligaeration, allegations and proof of fraud
tion is received in good faith to secure
against creditors must be more specific than
present advance or antecedent debt in
where no consideration passed (Laws 1925,
amount not disproportionately small as
c. 42).
compared with value of property or obligation obtained.
8. Fraudulent conveyances <3=>263(4), 301(1).
Where grantees are using property and 12. Limitation of actions <&=>100(1).
paying taxes pursuant to recorded deeds,
Respecting time of discovering fraud
plaintiffs seeking to set aside conveyances be- against creditors within limitation statute,
cause defrauding creditors must allege and where recorded conveyances indicate fair conprove that grantees misled plaintiffs (Comp. sideration, all persons may rely thereon until
Laws 1917, § 4900; Laws 1925, c. 42).
acquiring information sufficient to put reasonably prudent person on inquiry (Comp.
Aside from question of consideration,
Laws 1917, §§ 4900, 6408, subd. 4 ; Laws 1925,
plaintiffs must allege and prove that, as
c. 42, § 3).
grantees, grantees did certain acts which
misled plaintiffs, or held themselves out in
Comp. Laws 1917, § 64G8, subd. 4, proa way that misled plaintiffs and that
vides that action for relief on ground of
plaintiffs had knowledge and relied therefraud or mistake may be brought within
on. Comp. Laws 1917, § 49)00, provides
three years, and that cause of action is
that every conveyance from time of filing
not to be deemed to have accrued until agfor record, shall impart notice to all pergrieved party discovers facts constituting
sons of contents thereof.
fraud or mistake.
9. Fraudulent conveyances <§=^63(l), 295(1).
Creditor whose claim arisqs after recording of conveyance which he seeks Jo set
aside as fraudulent, must allege ancj prove
that ho was misled by pvert act into believing something different; fronj what record
showed (Popip, Laws J917, f 4900; Laws
1925, o, 42).

13, (.imitation of actions <§==>! 00(13).
Jtespecting time of discovering fraud
agaipst creditors, where recorded conveyances s ^ t e d consideration as $1 and other valuable considerations, statute ran from time
whop reasonably prudent person would have
inquired and discovered falsity, if any (Comp.
Lawg 1917, §§ 4900, 64(38, subd. 4).

10. Fraudulent conveyances <3=»27l(2).
In action to set aside conveyances as defrauding creditors, plaintiffs alleging that
credit was extended oil knowledge thai grantor owned conveyed property, had burden of
showing their information (Coyip. Lawp 1917,
§ 4900; Laws J025, c. 42).

14, pecords <§=>I9.
statute providing that conveyance filed
for record imparts notjee to all persons held
intended to constitute notice without rcfercpeQ to place of residence or otherwise (Comp.
La\ys 1917, § 4900).

Plaintiffs ajleged tfeat credit was extended on knowledge $nd belief that grantor was qwncr of conveyed property, and,
if this were true, pijph knowledge, in so
far as either allegation or prpof was concorned, must have been obtained from
source Qtjier than tfcaj of grantor qr $ran-

15, fraudulent conveyances G=>29l(l).
fphat testimony respecting wages contained discrepancies ip amounts would not
just|fy disallowing entjre amount.
Such discrepancies, would not justify
disallowance of entire amount, unjess
c$ijrt was of opinion that there wa^ no

@=>For other cases fee same topic an4 KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes
17 P.(2d)—17%
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veyed to their son, Lawrence Edwards, also a
defendant, by warranty deed, two tracts of
land aggregating about (»G acres generally re.
ferred to in the evidence as tracts R and V.
On the 8th day of December, 1020, a deed
passed between the same parties of like import for two additional tracts of land designated D and E. On the Oth day of December,
1920, the defendant George II. Edwards and
his wife conveyed to their son, Elmer Ed17. Fraudulent conveyances <©=>327.
wards, four tracts of land aggregating about
In equity proceeding, such as action to 58 acres, and referred to by exhibits and eviset aside conveyances as defrauding credi- dence as tracts F, G, H, and I. The stated
tors, Supreme Court may review law and consideration in each of the deeds is "for tin;
fact questions.
sum of one dollar and other good and valuable considerations.*' In addition to the stat18. Appeal and error <§=>I009(I).
In equity proceeding, judge's fact find- ed consideration in the granting and considings should stand unless Supreme Court is eration clauses, in the body of the deeds to
Elmer, two of the tracts, G and I, are each
convinced of error.*
stated to be "subject to a mortgage of $1,000.19. Fraudulent conveyances <§=>57(4).
00 which the grantee assumes and agrees to
In action to set aside conveyances as de- pay as part of the consideration." All of
frauding creditors, question is grantor's these deeds were duly filed for record in tbe
financial condition at time of conveyances, county recorder's office of Wasatch county,
not many years afterward (Laws 1925, c. 42). Utah, on December 23, 1920. There was also
a deed of conveyance from George II. Ed20. Limitation of actions <S=>!00(11).
wards and his wife to Lawrence Edwards
Action over 7 years after conveyances bearing date the 13th day of January, 1019,
were made and recorded, to set aside convey- and referring to a tract of land designated in
ances as defrauding creditors, held barred; the evidence and exhibits as tract A. This
there being opportunity for discovering fraud, deed was recorded on the 14th day of Janif any, over 3 years before suing (Comp. Laws uary, 1919, in the office of the recorder of
1917, §§ 4900, G4C8, subd. 4 ; Laws 1925, c. 42). Wasatch county, Utah. The trial court found
and decided that the conveyance relating to
21. Fraudulent conveyances <©=>295(I).
tract A "was not fraudulent and the same is
Evidence held insufficient to warrant getvalid as against any claim of the plaintiffs or
ting aside conveyances as defrauding crediintervenor," and no question as to tract A is
tors (Comp. Laws 1917, § 4900; Laws 1Q25,
presented upon this appeal. (D. H. Wenger,
C. 42, § 3, and | 2, subej. 1).
trustee, is sometimes referred to as plaintiff
•
and sometimes as intervener.)
contract for wages, or (lint, on a quantum
meruit, t lie re was nothing duo.
16. Fraudulent conveyances C^>76(l).
If wages owed by father to son, plus
amounts subsequently paid by son to father
for lands, failed of fair consideration, court
should have set aside conveyances as defrauding creditors and imposed, lien for amount
paid bona lide (Laws 1025, c. 12, § 3).

.
.
Appeal from. District Court, Wasatch Connt y ; A. V. Wafkins, Judge.
Action by Albert H. Smith and others
against George H. Edwards and others,
Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal,
Reversed, and remanded with directions.
•
Robinson & Robinson an<J A. B. Morgan,
all of Provo, for appellants,
H. O. Allen, and E. R. Chrjstensen, boflj of
Salt Lake City, and Abe Turner, of Prqvo,
for respondents.

JXhe object of the proceeding is to get aside.
the conveyances and subject the property J o
As disclosed by the
t h e c l a l m s 0 f creditors ;
evidence aside from the claims and interests
and equities of any parties to this proceeding,
there are interests and equities of other parties not parties hereto that would involve
much
litigation to determine, if the judgment
of the trial court is to stand. Nearly if not
a l l 0 f t h e p r o perty was, subsequent to the
conveyances, and long prior to the fringing
of this actiop, mortgaged b y ' t h e grantees
which mortgages were, in most instances, still
unpaid at the time of the trial of the cause.
The allegations of the complaint are of a
MOFFAT, district Judge.
general character. In response to the charge
The defendants are the appellants. !fbe of the defendant that the complaint is deplaintiffs (ire the respondents. We shall gfen- fective in that it contains no allegation with
eraUy refey tq them as plaintiffs and defend- respect to actual or constructive fraud and
ants, specifying them, by name or otherwise that no facts are pleaded from whioji actual
or constructive fraud can be inferred, the
when necessary.
0 n the 6tb day of December, 1920, the fle- plaintiffs (respondents) in summary of the
fcndant George H. Edwards apd his wife opp- allegations ot their complaint state; "There
can be founoj * * * the allegation that
l » *
'
•"""•'
'"*
mm
"•
< • mm* *
the conveyance was voluntary, w^s made
* Paxton v. J»**:ton (U|ah) 16 P.(2d) 105L
$=»Fof Q\\LQT casein see same topic and KJpIY DUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexe*
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SMITH v. EDWAKDS
I7r.(2«i)

with fhc fraudulent purpose and inient of de'frauding the creditors of said (icorge II. Kd-.vanls, and especially these plaintiffs, in
\. h Is fraudulent intent and purpose the said
,;.', *;dant (naming the grantee in that par. ; r <}ord) participated. * * * That
,..•. i, and all of said conveyances was made
, M] recorded without consideration and while
;•.„. said defendant (Soorgo II. Edwards was
indebted in large amounts of money * * *
, ftl all were made for the purpose of placing
nd properly beyond the reach of his crediiors, and the same were made as a part of
•i (tin-piracy and scheme of the said defend,i : ; <;eorge II. Kdwnrds, Lawrence Edwards
i d I'lhner Kdwards to defeat the just claims
«.f the creditors of said grantor, and ever
,iii<f the same were made the said Grantor
lias continued to have and use the said lands,
id enjoy the rents, income and profits thereurn, and the said defendants Lawrence Eduanls and Elmer Edwards have always, and
do now hold the said titles to said parcels of
land in secret trust for the defendant George
11. Kdwards." and particularly paragraph 13
K fHains an allegation of insolvency.
Paragraph 13 reads: "That by reason of
whl conveyances the said George H. Edwards
rendered himself unable to pay his creditors
without resorting to said lands.''
Paragraph 10 of the complaint not referred
to by counsel for plaintiffs contains the following statement: "That unless said conveyances are set aside the said defendant George
11, Edwards is and will be wholly insolvent,
am! that plaintiffs are without any adequate
ivaiedy in the ordinary course of law."
Counsel for plaintiffs then add: "Nothing
INMJV could be added which would make a
snore forcible and complete allegation of
triad, and facts constituting fraud in these

Utah
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pose may be inferred, and without stating
the facts constituting the scheme amount to
no more than saying the conveyances were
fraudulent. To allege the holding of land in
secret trust for another is alleging no more
than that the land is being held fraudulently.
The allegation that a grantor remains in possession of land after its conveyance is an allegation of fact, and such fact may or may
not prove fraud. The allegation that one
receives the rents, issues, and profits of property after its conveyance is an allegation of
fact, and, if proved, may or may not support
a charge of fraud. The allegation that "by
reason of said conveyances the grantor rendered himself unable to pay his debts or became insolvent" without specifying the
amounts, values, parties, or circumstances are
conclusions and to be available for the purpose of supporting proof must be amplified by
alleging facts sufficient to support the summarized conclusion, even if not attacked by
demurrer or motion.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act,
Laws of Utah 1925, c. 42, defines, among other things, "Insolvent person." This statute
is not only a declaration of the law of this
state now, but is a fair declaration of what
constitutes an insolvent person under generally accepted authority. Section 2, subd. 1,
reads: VA person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less
than the amount that will be required to pay
his probable liability on his existing debts as
they become absolute and matured."
To allege that a person is "insolvent" is alleging a pure conclusion. Under the statute
such a statement must be amplified by allegations of fact as to the amount of money required to pay his probable existing liabilities
as they mature, also by an allegation of what
the fair salable value of his property is, and
conveyances."
that such "present fair salable value is less
!tj Stripped of its tautology it may well be than the amount that will be required to pay"
dfulticd whether the alleged allegations of his existing debts specifying the amounts,
tii«» complaint amount to more than saying, and when they will mature.
*h. conveyances were voluntary and frauduTo the complaint the defendants interposed
lent. A conveyance without consideration is both a general and a special demurrer. Both
voluntary, hut not for that reason alone were overruled, and error is assigned therefraudulent. That a conveyance was made for, The general demurrer is not argued
v. Idle one is indebted "in large amounts of though much might be said in support of the
amaey" is not necessarily fraudulent; but general demurrer.
cfaihiued with other facts and circumstances,
[5, 61 The defendants pontend that the comMay he. Neither is a conveyance necessarily
fraudulent because it is made without can- plaint is uncertain and unintelligible in that
deration and while one is indebted iq large it cannot be ascertained; or determined from
.ni.Mints of money. One may still Have the allegations of the complaint, what acts of
ample resources to pay all of the "large fraud the defendants ha$ been guilty of with
aaanmts of money" and all otjier indebfcc}- respect to the transfers in question. The
;» s if such should exist at the time of nwjc- learned judge of the triqj court in overruling
defendants' demurrer m&de reference to the
in.' the conveyance, or as they mature,
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, supra,
:2 4} The allegations that the conveyances passed in 1925, indicating that because of the
^ r.> made for the purpose qf placing tfcfl act the complaint was sufficient. The convey'••r.-;vriy beyond the reach of creditors aiwj ances sought to be set qsjde had been macje
y• re made as a part of a scheme, withou^ in 1020, about five yearn before the passage
iU' statement qf facts from which the pty|i of the act and more ttyjn seven years bp
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fore the nelion was brought. Tt is nsserled,
however, that I lie alleged fraud was not discovered until 102G, or about a year after the
passage of the act. In so far as the cause of
action related to matters occurring prior to
the act, the act would have no effect. Wherein the act is merely declaratory of what the
law was at the time of the conveyance, it
would make no difference. rJJhp provisions of
the act are in harmony with the general'law"
""""o 11 11 Ie s 11bj e<11.
* 27 C. J. 772: "In the absence of some specific statutory provision, the rule is that the
facts upon which fraud is predicated must be
specifically pleaded. A mere general averment of fraud is nothing but the averment of
a conclusion and will not suffice; it presents
BO issue for trial and is bad on demurrer."
Goebel v. Gregg, 57 Cal. App. C51, 207 P.
917, 018: "It is a general rule that a deed of
gift is valid if the grantor was not indebted
at the time he made it, "or if he had otlier
means outside of the property conveyed with
which to pay his indebtedness." There is an
exception to this rule which "is based upon
the fact that if the debtor secretly and without the knowledge of one with whom he contracts an indebtedness transfers his property
without consideration, knowing that the creditor in dealing with him relies upon his ownership thereof, it constitutes actual fraud,
and upon a showing of such facts such transfer may be annulled."
Leavengood v. McGee, 50 Or. 233, 91 P. 453,
456: There must be alleged and proven facts
out of which a constructive fraud will arise
by force of law, or facts constituting actual
or expressed fraud. 'And the rule is that the
facts upon which fraud is predicated must be
specifically pleaded. A mere general averment of fraud is nothing but the averment of
a conclusion, and will not suffice. I t presents
no issue for trial, and is bad on demurrer.
Such an averment not only renders the bill or
complaint demurrable, but it will not even
sustain a decree.' " Citing 20 Cyc. 734; Leasure y. Forquer, 27 Or. 334, 41 P. 005.

conveyances. There is something said in argument as to another creditor being prior;
but no distinction is made either in the alleged findings or decree.
[8, 9] Whore the defendants, especially
Lawrence Edwards and Elmer Edwards, were
in possession, occupation, and use of the property and paying taxes thereon in pursuance
of a deed duly recorded, it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to allege and prove that, as
grantees, they did certain acts which misled
the plaintiffs, or held themselves out in a way
that misled plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs had
knowledge and relied thereon. This aside
from the question of consideration. As to
claims arising after a conveyance is made
and placed upon record, it is imperative that
a creditor, before he can set a conveyance
aside, must allege and prove that he was misled by some overt act into believing something different from what the record showed,
and of which he was bound at that time to
take notice of the contents.
There is a peculiar inconsistency of allegation of the complaint when compared with
the plaintiffs' theory of recovery. As to the
plaintiff Thomas H. Crook it is alleged that
the indebtedness was contracted upon the
faith of defendant's (George H. Edwards)
continued solvency, "and with the knowledge
that he had long been solvent and the owner
of said property." As to the plaintiff Wright,
it is alleged that the indebtedness was contracted upon the faith and because of the
knowledge that said debtor had been solvent
and was still the owner and apparent owner
of the property conveyed, ^ l i s indebtedness
was not contracted until May, 1022,.or more—^
*Than two years after the conveyances were^
placed of record in the recorder's office. As
to the Kohler minors substantially the same
allegations are made and yet the evidence ,
shows without contradiction that Mr. J. C.
Jensen was the guardian of those same minors at the time he prepared the very de^ds
sought to be set aside upon the ground of a
belief that George II. Edwards was the owner. Besides Mr. Jensen was an abstracter
and familiar with the records of Wasatch
county.
The record contradicted such
"knowledge," and there is neither allegation
nor proof that defendants said or did anything inconsistent with the record notice.

[7] It is not necessary to quote additional
authority to support the principle. Where
there is a valuable consideration or as the
statute provides "a fair consideration," which
is stated to be the fair equivalent therefor
and not disproportionate to the value of the
There is neither allegation nor proof that
property conveyed the requirement as to alle- George II. Edwards made an affirmative
gations and proof of fraud is more exacting. statement to any person that he was the ownThe complaint makes no distinction be- er of the conveyed premises, that there was
tween the alleged creditors of the grantor any affirmative act or conduct by which a
whether subsequent or prior to the convey- creditor could be said to be thrown off his
ances. Nor is it alleged the amount of in- guard, or act, representation, or misrepredebtedness, nor the value of the land con- sentation by which a creditor was induced to
veyed, nor the value of the assets remaining extend credit upon reliance that he said he
after the conveyances. The evidence shows was the owner of the property either before or
that the claims of all of the creditors, except after the conveyances were made, or that ElSmith and possibly one other, were claims mer or Lawrence intimated they were not
that arose subsequent to the making of the the owners as shown by the record.
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;} As heretofore indicated, the plaintiffs erty as shown by the state of the record.
, tli.,1 credit was extended upon the Some argue otherwise. Some aspects may he
,.ML<» and l»i»li«»f that (leorge II. Ed- examined: (1) Was the conveyance itself
,. w.i< Die owner of the conveyed prop- the fraud? or (2) was it fraud because the
If plaintiffs knew that he was the conveyance purported to be voluntary or
.- <,f the property, such knowledge must without consideration? or ('.)) did the conveyIMMII obtained from a source otlier than ance produce discoverable insolvency at the
,f Ccor.ue II. Edwards, or the other de- time it was made? If the conveyance. Jl,se|f
,nis in so far as either allegation or_^ constituted the fraud, its recordation was
f,i,„,f is concerned. The undisputed evidence notice of Its contents to all persons.
that Cicorge II. Edwards moved off the
[fl] The statutes and all the authorities
,,:,\.ycd tracts in June, 1921, about six agree that, if a fair consideration is given
ni.nihs after the recording of the eonvey- for the property or obligation, the trans; n.rs and that Lawrence and Elmer from the action, contract, obligation, or conveyance
lime of the recording of the deeds were in ac- may not be attacked because of the insolventual occupation and use of the property. The cy or inability of the debtor to pay his obli«iiily other sources of information as to title gations. The authorities likewise hold that
in this property would be the records in the a fair consideration is given "when in exo:'iec of the county recorder of Wasatch change for such property, or obligation, as
county, or from some interested or disinter- a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith,
ested third persons. No information is property is conveyed or an antecedent debt
tdiown to have originated from any source is satisfied, or when such property, or obliMther than the record itself. In such case the gation is received in good faith to secure a
burden is upon plaintiffs to show the infor- present advance or antecedent debt in
maiion, and, if such information is material, amount not disproportionately small as comit should be pleaded.
pared with the value of the property or
The statute raises a presumption of notice, obligation obtained." Uniform Fraudulent
and, when plaintiffs allege they have knowl- Conveyance Act, § 3.
edge when the credit was extended, it is not
The conveyances attacked all contain the
easy to discover how such information could
statement of consideration of "one dollar and
he theirs at the time of extending the credit
other valuable considerations" and one
itiid yet not be disclosed as found by the
of them contains in addition the statement
c.»urt till 1026 or about six years after the
that two of the tracts are each subject to a
conveyances were made and recorded.
mortgage in the "sum of $1,000.00 which the
The defendants pleaded that the causes of grantee assumes and agrees to pay."
action are barred under the provisions of
[12] Under the statute from the time of
Ounp. Laws Utah 1917, § 4900, and subdiviM«.II 4, § 64G8. Section 4900 provides: filing the conveyance with the recorder it
"Kvery conveyance or instrument in writing shall impart notice to all persons of the conaffecting real estate, executed, acknowledged, tents thereof, grom. the time of recording >
or proved, and certified in the manner pre- jhese conveyances ail persons, including^
Feribed by this title, * * * required by plaintiirg, notice was imparted to them
law to he recorded in the office of the county TTIe conveyances contained TITO—stirtements
1
the
Uud aft1
recorder, shall, from the time of filing the —„Jove" quoted.
• _ That
„
. , nlainldis
,
c
suae with the recorder for record, i m p a r t n o — f ^ e r Persons had ^ ^ ^ J ^
^ ^ ^
ances had been made and recorded seems*to
tie to all persons of the contents thereof,
,v.d Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and go without saying, for surely, if one is
I!< dhiMers shall be deemed to purchase^aiid charged with notice of^the contents, he must
be charged with notice o£ the. existence of tlie
i?.\e with notice."
Subdivision 4 of section 0108, Is as fol- document, itself»_ When the document couT
lows: "An action for relief on the ground tains a statement of facts indicating that
of fraud or mistake, three years; the cause litem was given for the property a fair conof action in such ease'not lo be Tleeiuod to sideration when as a fact no consideration
have accrued until the discovery by the ag- at all had been given, a very different situagrieved party of the facts constituting the tion is presented than a document showing
on its face that there was no consideration
fraud or mistake."
or only a nominal consideration. Under such
The parties agree the statute of limitations circumstances all persons would be entitled
is three years. They divide on the question to rely upon and would have imparted to
of inseovery. They approach the question them the information contained in the condifferently.
tents of the document, and until some inSome argue the recording of the deed im- formation came to hand sufficient to put a
parts notice to all persons of the contents reasonably prudent person upon inquiry he
thereof and constitutes such notice as will would be entitled} to rely upon the contents of
Mart the statute of limitations running as to the document. If may be argued that fraud
H »redder who may claim to be relying upon in the first situation consisted of the false
ownership, or implied ownership, pf prop- statement contained in the document, be-
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cause, no consideration passed and there is
the false statement in the document that
there was a valuable consideration. The
fraud was committed at that: time but may
'not be discoverable then. A creditor would
not discover the falsity of the statement until other information was brought to his attention suthcienf to put him on inquiry.
I
j
!
I
i
|
I
I
j

[I3J In this case the contents of the conYcyanees were of record and imparted notice of the contents and what the consider:!Hon was as shown thereby and all persons
might l)e expected to inquire forthwith of
what the "other valuable? considerations"
consisted, if the truthfulness was doubted
and failing to do so would cause the statute
to run from the time when a reasonably
prudent person would have acted and thereby discovered falsity if It existed.
In the case of Stivens v. Summers, (J8 Ohio
St. 421, 07 N. 10. 884, a father and mother
conveyed lands to two of their sons, rendering the father insolvent while indebted. The
(U^'ilH recited a good and valuable consideration. Notes, however, were given payable to
the administrator after the death of the
surviving grantor. The court says: (page
88G, of 67 N. E.) "Sine© the action could
not be maintained but fqr the facts found
respecting the financial condition of the
grantor at the time of making the deeds, and
since the record dicj not djsclose those facts,
it cannot be said that the fraud was discovered until the plaintiff, from a different source,
received notice of such facts. A deed fraudulent as tq creditors may recite the payment of a full and valuable consideration by
the grantee, and an examination of the record would not discJose to a creditor of the
grantor that a cause of actjon has accrued in
his favor."

[|4] The citation just quoted and the one
following indicate the difficulty which exists
in suits of this character, T he difficulty arises, not out of the enunciation of well settled principles of law, but put of making application of those'well settled principles to
the facts and circumstance^ of the particular
easp.j. Unless the notice refprred to in Comp.
pXwws Utaji 1017, § 4000, means wljat it says
I then one is loft to trace ouf from the uncerv f* * tainties of human activities, memories, and
•Nsi { conflicting interests what the facts were.
r Evidently the statute was intended to con;
I stitqte notice of the contents of the recorded
\ document, withoqt reference to place of resil i e n c e or otherwise.
Under bomp. £aws Utah 1017, § 0408, the
provision is cjear tftat the limitation, does not
begip to run nntjl the facts constituting the
fraud are discovered. There is therefore a
great deal said in the cases about what
amounts JQ discovery,
Chjnn V. Curtis (Ky.) 71 S. W. p23, 924.
The evidence showed (hat the fatjier and son

Jived together. There was no change of possession. The son did not pay the taxes.
The father was insolvent. The son paid $ loo
to the father which was found to be inailequale. As a part of the judgment the court
held the conveyance should be set aside, hut
the son was entitled to a lien against, the
property for the .$100, and further held that
"the recording of such conveyances is hnportant in establishing the time of the perpetration of the fraud, but it throws little
light, of itself, upon the question of discovery. It is admissible evidence on that question; and when the manner of its execution
and registration, and other facts and circumstances in the case, would be suflicient to
put a person of prudent mind upon inquiry,
the law declares this to be notice, because
he should have made the inquiry, and wil| be
held to have done so, whether he did or not."
The language of the Utah statute, Conip.
Laws Utah 1017, § 0J0.H, subd. 4, upon pie
provision referring to "discovery," contains
the following language: "The cause of netion in such case not to be deemed to hjjve
accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake."
In the case of Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn.
}13, 72 N. W. 838, 830, the Minnesota coijrt,
Jn construing a statute in which the words,
t'the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting the fraud" are discussed,
proceeds to say:
"The facts constituting the fraud were tjio
conveyance by the debtor with intent to defraud his creditors. When an action for relief * * * is not commenced until more
tjian six years after the commission of the
acts constituting the fraud, the burden is
qn the plaintiff to allege and prove that he
<|id not discover the facts constituting tjie
fraud. * * * The question is, what constitutes a 'discovery' within the meaning i>t
tjie statute? Mere constructive notice of the
deed by reason of its being filed for record is
i|pt notice of the facts constituting the fraud.

* * *
"To ascertain wha,t constitutes 'a discovery
Of the facts constituting the fraud/ referenced
ijpist be had to tjie principles of equity.'!
* * * Itajce, in actions in equity, the rule I
\yns that the iiie7in*s,pf'lvnowlC<lge were equip5*
ajent to actmii kuowledgq;,4hat is, "thatS**
knowledge of facts which would have put an
ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which,
if followed up, woulu" have resulted in a dinco,yjejwj^fjMie fraud, was equivalent to actual
fljscovery."
The evidence discloses: The deeds were
jnatfe and recorded Jn December, 1920. The
deeds contained, among other things, the
statement "for one dollar and other good and
valuable considerations." At least one of th«
(Jopds contained an agreement to assume and
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T,;V two mortgages against the property oou- doctrine of consideration, what it takes to
VOVIM] in the sum of $1,000 each. There was constitute «'i good and valuable consideration
a "change of possession within about six or the law relating to contracts between parninths after the conveyances. The property ent and child, present, past, or future obligaWJIS mortgaged'by the grantees. All of this tions.
Information could have been obtained readily
[15,161 An examination of the separate anNo»Jnquiry_of any_ nature swer of the defendant Lawrence Edwards and
Up,.n inquiry.
!.,--u\< to have been made. All parties bo-brielly summarized alleges: That about Det: ,1, .»s shown by the eVidence, that there cember, 1920, George II. Edwards owed Law, v:i - no financial diiliculty until the year 1023, rence $1,050 for wages under a specific agreeto cause; either debtor or creditors to suspect ment. That Lawrence and his father entered
i.uancial trouble or threatened insolvency. into an agreement by the terms of which LawThe evidence also indicates without serious rence was to buy and his father was to sell to
ninflict that, after the conveyances were him the property in question for $10,000.
made, the grantor was worth, upon the esti- That the $-1,650 was credited to Lawrence upmated values prevailing at that time, much on the obligation and that the father took a
tanrc than his indebtedness. Subsequent note for $5,350, payable in two years at 6 per
1< cs and depreciation account for insolven- cent, interest. That in 1921 Lawrence borcy. One of the creditors testified that he rowed from the state of Utah $2,500 and gave
probably had actual notice of the convey- a mortgage upon the land in question and
ances as early as 1923.
paid $2,450 upon the note. That Lawrence
The t r i a l voxirt held that the deed executed also borrowed from a bank (naming it) $1,000
to Lawrence in 1019 was not fraudulent. The and pledged certain personal property and
i!Iter deeds were executed and filed for ree- paid that amount upon the note. This note
. r.i in December, 1920. George II. Edwards to the bank was unpaid at the time of trial.
a::<i his wife moved in the following June, These allegations in the answer of Lawrence
r.'-l. out of the house on one of the tracts con- Edwards were all proved by the testimony of
v ycd, and Elmer and Lawrence moved into both Lawrence and his father. None of it
the house then vacated by their father and was seriously questioned by plaintiffs except
mother and remained in occupancy until the that part relating to the agreement for servnine of bringing suit in 1927. The grantees ices between father and son and the amounts.
j.a id the taxes, received the rents and profits, That there was such an agreement is not disand were in open exclusive possession for puted by any competent evidence. Both fasnore than six years before the bringing of ther and son testify to it. No one denies it.
suit. None of these facts are seriously dis- That Lawrence worked for his father during
puted. There are some assumptions by some the period stated is not questioned or diswitnesses that George II. Edwards was in pos- puted. There are some discrepancies between
: es-ion, because he was occasionally seen up- the total amount alleged and the amount that
on some of the conveyed premises, or that would result from the calculation of the
some of the proceeds sold by the hoys were monthly schedule and deducting such sums as
applied upon indebtedness of their father.
may have been drawn. Because there were
There is not a word of testimony in the some discrepancies in amounts, would not jusrecord that the defendant George II. Edwards tify the disallowance of the whole amount unmade any representation to any creditor that less the court was of opinion that there was
he was or ever had been the owner of any of no contract, or upon a quantum meruit for
the lands in question other than what might services there was nothing due. Certainly,
arise hy implication out of a course of deal- under the evidence, the services claimed to
ing prior to the time of making the convey- have been were rendered. The court should
ances. No creditor or other person, so far as have determined the amount due if there was
(he evidence discloses, asked George II. Ed- a question as to that and if the amount due
wards, at the time, whether or not he was the for services less the amounts paid plus the
owner of any of the lands in question at the amounts subsequently paid on the alleged purtime of incurring any of the indebtedness, nor chase price failed of a fair consideration, set
afterward until some difficulty in collecting aside the conveyances and subject the premiswas experienced. The evidence seems to es- es to a lien for the amount paid in good faith
tablish beyond question that George II. Ed- upon the transaction,
wards regarded himself solvent at the time of
making the conveyances, and for at least three
[17,18] This being an equity proceeding
years thereafter, and the evidence further dis- this court may review questions of both law
closes that no one else seemed to suspect in- and fact. It is established that, in reaching
solvency until after Edwards himself in 1923 conclusions as to facts, the findings made by
W>gan to realize that he was in financial dif- the trial court should not be disturbed unless
ticutiies.
we are convinced that they are wrong, but,
The plaintiffs have attacked the alleged when so convinced, it becomes our duty to set
consideration for the conveyances. It is not them aside. Paxton v. Paxton (Utah) 15 P.
accessary to discuss the law relating to the (2d) 1051.
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K\<vpf, (ov the discrepancies referred to,
there seems no reason to doubt (lie truthfulness of I he testimony of tlie grantees, eertniuly not sufficient to justify the conclusion that
their whole testimony was so tinctured with
perjury as to justify the rejection of it in toto.
In fact most of the evidence in tin? record
whether for or against either party came
[from (Joorgo II. Kdwards and his two sons.
We see no good reason in the light of the
whole record why their testimony should he
accepted as to certain matters and rejected as
to others, except where they were properly
impeached, or such discrepancies existed as
to particular matters as to require' its rejection upon those matters.
What has been said with reference to the
answer and proof of Lawrence Kdwards, applies substantially, except as to amounts, difference of property, age, etc., to Elmer Edwards, and it would serve no good purpose
to refer to the testimony, and elements of the
situation in detail. Values vary with time,
place, conditions, and circumstances, and are
largely matters of opinion. This is especially
true as to lands, live stock, range rights, and
other varieties of property.

M

,r
',;/

(

valuable consideration, If not nn adequate
one, for the conveyances. Part of it tin? cancellation of an Obligation, past, present, or
closely subsequent to the time of the conveyance. It is not necessary in the light of what
has been said to discuss the* many errors assigned, especially those? as to the findings ami
conclusions. This opinion suflicieutly indicates that the judgment should have been for
the defendants, and that the action should
have been dismissed.
Because of the errors referred to the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the
cause remanded with directions to dismiss the
action. Appellants to recover costs.
CHERRY, C. J., and STRAUP, FOLIAND,
and EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., concur.
ELIAS HANSEN, J., being disqualified, did
not participate herein*

[19] The testimony in this case was permitNELSON v. LOTT.
ted to take a very wide range. Most of the
No. 5268.
testimony refers to matters long after it could
throw any light upon the issues in the case.
Supreme Court of Utah.
It may be easy to show insolvency seven years
Dec. 28, 1932.
after a transaction. The question is not the
financial condition so long""after"THit whaf
was it at. the tinie. Td'TI'ustrateX. Oiuf 6F 1. Appeal and error <&=>I064(I).
Instruction respecting giving of warning
~tho.items, though small, did not arise between*"*
by
motorist
striking pedestrian held prejudi"George U Ed wa rds and" acreditor until 1826,
or six years after the conveyances. Not the cially erroneous because warranting finding
slightest suspicion of either actual or con- of negligence if defendant failed to sound
structive fraud could have entered into the horn regardless of necessity therefor.
Instruction was in substance that if jury
matter at the time.
found plaintiff was standing in lane and
In matters of this kind considerable latithat defendant drove automobile in directude is usually granted by a trial court. The
tion
of plaintiff and upon him, and in so
character of the case makes this necessary.
doing failed and neglected to so operate
The record was unnecessarily extended by the
automobile as to avoid striking plaintiff,
admission of much testimony so far remote
or failed and neglected to sound horn or
as to b:* of no value in throwing any light upgive any warning of approach, and that no
on the transactions which took place in 1020,
warning of approach was given, and if
or the financial condition of George II. Edjury should further find that such negliwards at that time.
gence, if any, was direct and proximate
""*' [20, 21] Wo are of the opinion that the accause of injury, and that plaintiff exertion jshnj;n>rTTTn^"r the statute of limitations
cised reasonable care for his own safety,
•orthe'^reiisTm that discovery was made, or
jury should return verdict for plaintiff,
the situation was such as to furnish full opjpTiTuuity for the dT?cTm»t,y uf TrMTTuTif any_ 2. Automobiles C=>I5I.
Motorist's failure to give warning does
Twisted, more than tliree years he fore the
-^
not constitute negligence where there is no
ILT of the action. Wo arc
apparent necessity for warning and obligaly on the part of tlfe grantees, "and not suf- tion to give signal is not imposed under cirficient on the part of the grantor to justify the cumstances by statute (Laws 1921, c. 83, p.
setting aside of the conveyances. There was 234, § 397S).
no proof of insolvency at the time the con- 3. Automobiles <§=»245(6).
veyances were made or for about three years
Whether ordinary care required motorist
thereafter. There was, to say the least, a striking pedestrian standing in lane leacjin
(§=>For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes
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